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UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING INTERNATIONAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE LAW: U.N.
REGULATIONS DURING AN H5N1 AVIAN FLU EPIDEMIC
TIMOTHY J. MIANO
INTRODUCTION
In 1918, over one billion people – half the world’s population – contracted a virulent
form of bird flu.1 Spain was the first country to report an outbreak of the disease, and thus the
flu strain became known as the Spanish Flu. The virus killed more than eight million Spaniards
in one month.2 Influenza killed approximately fifty million people worldwide that year,
including 500,000 people in the United States.3
In 2003, a strain of avian flu known as H5N1 spurred new fears of a flu pandemic, this
time in South Korea.4 In response, Korean authorities culled the region’s entire poultry
population, killing over 150 million birds.5 As of December 2005, fifteen countries have
reported cases of the “highly pathogenic” H5N1 virus in poultry.6 Five of those countries have
reported 120 cases of interspecies transmission to humans,7 67 of which were fatal.8
Although an infectious disease pandemic implicates many areas of international law,
most of those areas of law lack sufficient maturity to provide any concrete guidance during a
large-scale emergency. For example, in Case of D v. United Kingdom,9 the European Court of
Human Rights held that Britain could not deport a convicted drug trafficker back to his home
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country of St. Kitts because the developing nation lacked the health standards necessary to treat
D’s late stage AIDS.10 The European Court found that deporting D would have violated human
rights norms requiring humane treatment because D would have spent “his remaining days in
pain and suffering in conditions of isolation, squalor and destitution.”11 Although the theory
behind the European Court’s application of normative international human rights law had
merit,12 other courts have declined to follow Case of D in the absence of “compelling
circumstances.”13 Broadly speaking, despite its noble aspirations, the rule of law espoused in
Case of D carries little practical weight when applied to an emergency of notable magnitude
because this rule presumes that the nation adjudicating the claim is not actively under the threat
of an epidemic.14
Like the human rights law applied in Case of D, principles from the law of war and
international environmental law tangentially address infectious disease through such topics as the
treatment of detainees, the use of biological weapons, the standards of air and water quality, and
the problems accompanying deforestation.15 As in Case of D, these areas of international law
have value during isolated incidents or in cultivating national policy. However, these
international doctrines provide no practical guidance in the prevention of or in the reaction to
widespread infectious disease.
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Industrialized nations, international law practitioners, and scholars have not been blind to
the threat of disease. For more than 150 years, nations have been forming multilateral
agreements designed to halt the spread of infection.16 The impetus for the original agreements
was to protect the flow of commercial goods and tourists across borders.17 However, as the
world’s population has tripled to 6.5 billion over the last fifty years18 and national economies
have become increasingly interdependent, priorities in the control of infectious disease have
matured.
This article will focus on the two major United Nations (“UN”) agreements that have
attempted to regulate the activities of Member States as they relate to infectious disease. The
International Health Regulations (“IHR”)19 protects public health directly by providing a
structure for global disease reporting and by enumerating the rights and duties of individual
states in controlling the spread of disease.20 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”)21 protects public health indirectly by dictating the
circumstances under which international trade may be restricted to prevent the spread of
disease.22
Part I of this article analyzes the transition from the old International Health Regulations
(“IHR”) to the newly revised IHR and the rights and duties of States created by this new
framework. Part II considers the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
16
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Measures (“SPS Agreement”) and analyzes specific illustrations of the SPS Agreement at work.
Both Parts I and II provide real and hypothetical examples of health emergencies in order to
create context for analyzing the regulations and to fill in some of the peripheral gaps. Finally,
Part III notes some of the strengths and weaknesses of the regulations by applying them to a
simplified hypothetical H5N1 avian flu pandemic.
I.

THE REVISED INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS

The revised International Health Regulations will become binding on Member States in
2007, twenty-four months after the WHO Director-General adopted them.23 The original IHR,
adopted in 1951 and initially titled the International Sanitary Regulations (“ISR”), was
comparatively narrow in scope and intent.24 The WHO had no enforcement capabilities under
the old regulatory scheme and, as a result, countries largely ignored many disease notification
requirements.25 This disregard, in part, prevented any disease control custom from maturing into
binding international law.26
The World Health Assembly adopted the revised IHR in the era of modern infectious
disease.27 In March 2003, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) plagued several parts
of the world.28 After nine months of outbreaks, the World Health Organization (“WHO”)
reported 8422 SARS cases and 916 SARS deaths worldwide.29 SARS was a first in many
respects; for example, SARS was the first severe infectious disease of the 21st century fueled by

23
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global air travel.30 As such, SARS was the first infectious disease not subject to traditional
limitations of transmission. Specifically, the disease could not have “burned itself out” by killing
off its primary population because it was not “an infectious disease confined to a particular
geographical location.”31 SARS also was the first pandemic during which the WHO was able to
appraise the potential influence of the revised health regulations.
In 2005, after ten years of work, the Member States of the World Health Assembly
(“WHA”) adopted the revised IHR.32 The goal of this new convention was to ensure “the
application of adequate measures for the protection of public health and strengthening of the
global public-health response to the international spread of disease.”33 The revision of the IHR
was “a closely watched and often controversial international legal reform effort” as the revisers
sought the proper balance between protection of state sovereignty and independence on one hand
and adequate global protection from the spread infectious disease on the other.34 The revised
IHR is broader in scope than the original regulations and affects the responsibilities of state
actors, the rights among states, and the authority of the WHO in dealing with the control and
containment of infectious disease.
A.

The Original International Health Regulations: The IHR

From the first international sanitary conference, held in 1851, until the WHO formally
adopted the ISR in 1951, there was little change in the objective of international infectious
disease regulation.35 The goal of the ISR – subsequently renamed the IHR – was to “protect
States against the international spread of infectious disease in a way that minimized interference

30
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with international trade and travel.”36 This principle was concisely reflected in the three primary
obligations under the old IHR: notification, transport hygiene, and vaccination certification.37
These objectives were limited in three ways. First, these were the only international regulations
to cover infectious diseases. Second, the only diseases covered were cholera, plague, and yellow
fever.38 Third, these measures were “the maximum measures applicable to international
traffic,”39 and therefore Member States could not impose more stringent requirements.
Ultimately, the IHR were commerce-centered safety measures designed both to react to
spreading infectious disease and to prevent states from harming international trade by
overreacting to the threat of disease.
The reactive system created by the IHR, though ambitious for its time, ultimately was
ineffective. Economic realities and the lack of an enforcement mechanism rendered the states’
obligations of notification, certification, and hygienic transport both economically unfeasible and
practically unenforceable. Under the old regulations, nations were bound only by honor to report
any case of the three listed diseases to the WHO and, under the IHR, nations suffered no
penalties for noncompliance.40 Such an idealistic requirement was doomed to fail. Poorer
nations with the highest rates of disease lacked the resources to report, while wealthy nations
lacked incentive to report events that would harm trade and tourism.41 Certification requirements
were equally problematic. When wealthy nations required health certificates, the subject diseases
frequently were unlisted diseases, such as HIV, that nonetheless posed a great health risk.

36

Id. at 5.
Lawrence O. Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of the World Health Organization’s
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Again, whether for listed or for unlisted disease, poorer nations simply lacked the resources to
comply with certification requirements.42
Similarly, the hygienic transport hubs requirements, including clean water and food
requirements, health inspections, and appropriate quarantine facilities, were neglected because
poor nations lacked the resources to meet the requirements. 43 Wealthy nations also struggled
with the transport hub requirements, but the difficulty was effectiveness rather than execution.
Cholera, plague, Ebola, AIDS, and SARS often are not symptomatic infectious diseases during
ingress and egress, but only become so after transit.44 Therefore, although some nations were
facially compliant with the transport hubs requirements, those countries still were unable to stop
diseases at the door.
Moreover, the IHR’s reactive nature ultimately doomed the system because it provided
no guidance for dealing with new and unknown infectious diseases. Rather, “[a]ny new
pathogen, or resurging old ones, not listed as ‘disease subject to the Regulations’ fell outside
IHR’s surveillance system.”45 Emerging health threats such as Ebola and HIV/AIDS were
neither reportable under the IHR nor subject to its tracking requirements. In 1995, with
HIV/AIDS and the proliferation of biological weapons drawing attention to world health issues,
the WHO began revising the IHR.46 Further, the emergence of the SARS disease and the
WHO’s ineffective handling of the outbreak accelerated the revision process.47 These events
also demonstrated that the new IHR needed to be “a flexible framework that [could] respond to

42

Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law, supra note 37.
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unknown disease events rapidly.”48 In May 2005, the WHO adopted the new IHR, proclaiming
the “effective death” of the traditional outbreak/response approach embodied in the old IHR.49
B.

The Revised International Health Regulations: Expanded Goals and
Broadened Scope

Like the old system, the revised IHR’s goals include the avoidance of “unnecessary
interference with world trade and travel.”50 Unlike the old system, the new IHR’s proactive
disease-prevention measures center on public health and take qualified priority over commercial
interests. The broadened scope of the revised IHR reflects this shift in priorities.
1.

Broadened Definition of Disease

The new IHR applies to broadly defined events. Whereas the old regulations were
limited to a small number of specific diseases, the revised IHR applies to all communicable and
non-communicable public health emergencies of international concern and encompasses both
natural and artificial threats.51 The IHR defines a public health emergency as “an extraordinary
event [that] is determined, as provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a public health
threat risk to other States through the international spread of disease[;] and (ii) to potentially
require a coordinated international response.”52 This definition requires some unpacking.
An international public health emergency exists when there is a manifestation – or a clear
danger of a manifestation – of a significant human medical illness that either poses a threat to the
international population or requires a coordinated multinational response. The language is broad
enough to encompass both ongoing long-term diseases such as HIV/AIDS and future fast-

48
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spreading communicable diseases that have not yet been identified. Moreover, the definition
also includes current but yet unrealized threats of such illnesses.
Twenty-first century diseases such as SARS will be classified as public health
emergencies under the revised IHR. SARS first emerged in China in late 2002 and had been
identified in Singapore, Hong Kong and Canada by March of 2003.53 The mobility of the
disease and the evidence of cross-border transmission both suggest that SARS would have
qualified as a threat to the international population.54 Furthermore, characteristics of the newlydiscovered disease, including the lack of diagnostic tests and a vaccine, the lack of effective
treatment, and SARS’ 15% fatality rate 55 suggested both a threat to the international population
and the need for a coordinated multinational response. Thus, newly-discovered diseases like
SARS now will fall under the IHR and will be subject to these international regulations as well
as to country-specific treatment and prevention measures.56
2.

Broadened Reporting Structure: Information Centralization and
Incorporation of Non-State Actors

The second important structural component of the IHR is the WHO’s centralization of
information and its incorporation of non-state actors. Under the new IHR, the WHO has the
“authority and responsibility . . . to collect and act upon sources of information.”57 That is, the
WHO must collect disease event reports from Member States, must maintain qualified
confidentiality on information, and must declare international public health emergencies.58 The

53

See Sapsin et al., supra note 28 (discussing SARS outbreaks and governmental responses in various affected
nations).
54
IHR, supra note 19, at art. 1.
55
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WTO also may use non-state sources of information concerning public health.59 When utilizing
data from non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), the IHR “imposes duties on [the] WHO to
engage in such collection efficiently and effectively . . . [and] verify such information.”60
According to one commentator:
[t]he New IHR . . . [makes] non-State actors formally part of the governance
mechanism of the revised Regulations. Increasing the scope of participation in
this way highlights how the process of achieving global health security differs
from the State-centric approach of international health security found in the
classical regime. WHO’s ability to gather and use non-governmental sources of
information and the obligation on States Parties to respond to request for
verification of such information received from WHO mean that States no longer
dominate or control the process of epidemiological surveillance.61
The value of this dynamic system is two-fold. First, the IHR creates incentives for states
to report health events while simultaneously allowing the WHO to collect data from
NGO sources and declare public health emergencies in a state without that state’s
consent.62 Second, the IHR requires transparency in the WHO’s process because the
WHO must verify any NGO data that it relies on and also must demonstrate effective
data collection techniques used by the particular NGO providing the data.63 Thus, the
IHR diffuses the disincentives of reporting health events that plagued the old system.
C.

The Content of the Revised IHR

The content of the revised IHR may best be understood by dividing the revision into two
components: (1) the obligations of states and (2) the rights of states. The new regulations take a
formalistic international law approach, including the establishment of positive duties and the
59

Id at art. 7. NGOs played a substantial role in the tracking the spread of SARS, but although NGOs may be
reliable sources of information about infectious diseases, at least one commentator has argued that the WHO ought
not to rely on the actions of parties that are not legally bound to the WHO. See David Bishop, Note, Lessons from
Sars: Why the WHO must Provide Greater Economic Incentives for Countries to Comply with International Health
Regulations, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1173 (2005).
60
Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27, at 52.
61
Id. at 51.
62
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handling of enforcement. The revised IHR will become the central international framework for
combating international infectious disease.
1.

The Duties of States Under the Revised IHR

The IHR unquestionably raises issues of sovereignty because it imposes affirmative
obligations on the independent nations that are members of the WHA.64 As Article 3.4 makes
clear, “States . . . have the sovereign rights to legislate and to implement legislation in pursuance
of their health policies. In doing so they should uphold the purpose of these Regulations.”65
Clearly, the IHR runs into the same enforcement problems as other multilateral treaties.66 As
noted however, these regulations provide incentives for nations, especially developed nations, to
follow their obligations because Member States have no veto power over the WHO’s health
emergency reports.67
Annex I of the revised IHR spells out the “core capacity requirements for surveillance
and response,”68 detailing states’ obligations under the IHR. In particular, nations must “detect
events involving disease,” must “assess reported events,” must “notify [the] WHO immediately,”
and must “report all essential information.”69 Additionally, each state must create and maintain a
“public health emergency contingency plan.”70 The responsibilities of states follow the
overarching themes of the IHR: respond to the emergency and mitigate any resulting damage.
Specifically, the IHR places duties on states by building a streamlined event reporting system
and by importing binding aspects of international law into the health regulations.

64

See, generally, Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213 (2002) (for a
discussion of the interplay between treaty making, intergovernmental organizations, and state sovereignty).
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See infra Part III.B.
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The IHR lays out a mandatory disease reporting system; states must follow the IHR’s
decision instrument in deciding which events it must report to the WHO.71 This instrument
describes three paths for reporting public health events.72 Each path lays out a course of
treatment for a different class of diseases: (1) known diseases whose outbreaks are unexpected
and serious, such as a new influenza strain or SARS; (2) known diseases with a demonstrated
ability to become emergencies, including the plague or Ebola; and (3) unknown or potential
threats.73 The instrument dictates that states must report any disease outbreak falling under class
(1), and states must analyze the need to report to the WHO any disease outbreak falling under
classes (2) and (3).74 The analysis weighs factors of seriousness, expectation, risk of spreading,
and impact on trade.75
For example, if a Romanian farmer contracts SARS, Romania must report the incident to
WHO under class (1) because the outbreak would be of a disease known to be a serious threat.
But if a rural healthcare worker in Zambia contracts cholera then the threat of international
spread is lower and the event is less unusual. The Zambia outbreak would not be “unexpected,”
and the automatic reporting requirement under class (1) would not be triggered. Under a class
(2) analysis, Zambia may not be obliged to report the case. In contrast, a cholera outbreak in
South Korea might trigger a mandatory report by that country because cases are uncommon, a
high population density exists, and international travel is more prevalent.
Another markedly different way that the revised IHR obliges states is by appropriating
other aspects of international law and integrating them into the domestic public health

71

Id. at art. 6.1.
Id. at Annex II.
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requirements.76 Though states must satisfy the IHR health measures, the regulations do not
preclude states from implementing domestic laws that “achieve the same or greater level of
protection.”77 However, “such measures shall not be . . . more intrusive to persons than
reasonably available alternatives.”78 This requirement invokes the Siracusa Principles, which
outline the ways individual human rights may be curtailed for the protection of public health.79
Unlike the decision instrument, which places a positive duty on states, the Siracusa Principles
place a negative duty on states. The Siracusa Principles require that states must enact only those
health measures that are “necessary, proportionate, and fair” 80 and prohibit states from enacting
health measures that fall outside the bounds of these criteria.81 In effect, the IHR couches public
health in the broader context of international human rights law.
Consider, for example, Canada’s first reported SARS patient in March 2003.82 The
Canadian government amended its Quarantine Act and Regulations to “authorize detention of
travelers with suspected SARS for up to twenty days.”83 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control
now report that the incubation period for SARS is one to twelve days.84 Suppose China reports
ten new cases of SARS among dockworkers. If the Canadian government further amends its
statute and quarantines all Chinese freight ships and crew suspected of carrying SARS for sixty
days, Canada would violate the IHR. First, Canada’s quarantine of all ships would be over-

76

The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, reprinted in 7 Hum. Rts. Q. 3, 7 (1985) [hereinafter The Siracusa Principles]; IHR, supra note 19, at
art. 43.1.
77
IHR, supra note 19, at art. 43.1; The Siracusa Principles, supra note 76.
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IHR, supra note 19, at art. 43.1.
79
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Gostin, World Health Law, supra note 24, at 423.
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and their application to public health regulations).
82
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Martin I. Meltzer, Multiple Contact Dates and SARS Incubation Periods, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
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inclusive because the quarantine would be “more restrictive of international traffic . . . than
reasonably available alternatives.”85 Second, the Canadian measure would not be “based on
scientific principles,”86 given that the average SARS incubation is four days. To quarantine
ships and travelers for sixty days violates the clear language of the IHR.87 Moreover, the broader
human rights protections in the Siracusa Principles require that “government infringing on the
enjoyment of human rights provide justification for such infringements.”88 Thus, the IHR
“balance[s] sovereignty, science and public health” by requiring appropriate information and
enjoining irrational or ill-suited reactions to public health emergencies.89
2.

The Rights of the States Under the New IHR

The IHR lays out the rights that states have with respect to the WHO and clarifies
domestic rights relating to public health emergencies.90 Although the notion of states’ rights
implicates larger topics in international law, the IHR creates positive rights for states by
outlining the WHO’s negative duties under the new regulations. By enumerating states’ rights
through the IHR, the WHO may be held expressly accountable for its actions. Further, proper
state action in difficult scenarios becomes clear when states understand not only their obligations
but also the boundaries of their rights.
One such right is the states’ right to confidentiality. The WHO is obliged to keep all
health data confidential except in the case of a “public health emergency of international
concern” or where state control measures “are unlikely to succeed.”91 The value of this system is
clear; the right to confidentiality encourages the flow of information and mitigates the
85

IHR, supra note 19, at art. 43.1.
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The Siracusa Principles, supra note 76; IHR, supra note 19, at art. 43.1.
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Id. at 59.
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unnecessary loss of international commerce without extending so broadly as to threaten the
public at large. However, this right extends only to the relationship between the WHO and the
Member States.
The IHR also clarifies some activities that states may rightfully undertake irrespective of
WHO, most notably the right to quarantine. In April 2003, Singapore amended its Infectious
Disease Act to “require persons with [possible SARS] to report to designated treatment centers, .
. . enforce home quarantine with electronic tagging and forced detention; and allow the
quarantine and destruction of SARS-contaminated property.”92 Singapore used fines, in-home
cameras, and arrests to enforce the quarantine of over 740 people.93 All of these measures are
acceptable under the new IHR. Although the IHR requires medical examinations to be the “least
obtrusive [measures] . . . that would achieve the public health objective,”94 the same standard
does not expressly apply to vaccinations, prophylaxes, isolations, or quarantines. Furthermore,
“the revised Regulations do not contain requirements that State Parties accord those subject to
compulsory measures due process protection, such as the right to challenge such measures in
court.”95 In this manner, the IHR affirms a State’s right to restrict and protect its population as it
sees fit.
Rather than establishing rules for uniform quarantine policies among states, the IHR does
not expressly attempt to limit or guide the use of quarantine. 96 Instead, a state may quarantine a
person without that person’s consent when the state deems that “such a compulsory measure is

92

Sapsin et al., supra note 28, at 159.
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necessary to control an imminent public health threat.”97 There are three reasons for making this
an unquestionable states’ right. First, the WHO lacks the ability to enforce uniform domestic
quarantines. Adding superfluous or symbolic requirements to binding regulations weakens the
overall system. Second, nations would be unlikely to agree to give up sovereign rights of selfgovernance and domestic population control in making quarantine decisions. Even if quarantine
rules were merely an unenforceable gesture, such an act might gestate into binding international
custom despite states’ objections. Third, the imposition of hard and fast limits on the ability of
states to isolate sections of its population is not in the interest of the WHO or its Member States,
even when extreme circumstances would implicate human rights. These regulations are not
meant to symbolically handcuff states in the face of international public health threats, especially
when those threats are unpredictable. The threat to the population’s welfare outweighs the lack
of “compulsory due process protections, such as the right to challenge [quarantine] in court.”98
The SARS outbreak illustrates why the WHO is not in a position to uniformly constrain
quarantine policy. In Singapore, 740 people were under full quarantine measures within twentyfour days of the first SARS cases.99 Through the emergency measures, “the average time from
onset of SARS symptoms to isolation of probable cases declined . . . from 6.8 days to 1.3
days.”100 In total, Singapore reported 238 cases with a population density of 6,400 persons per
square kilometer.101 Similarly, in Hong Kong more than 1,000 people were quarantined within
twenty-three days after the first case of SARS in that country.102 Hong Kong has a similar

97

Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27, at 45.
Id.
99
Sapsin et al., supra note 28, at 159.
100
Id.
101
FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE, AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 29, at 4; CIA, The World Factbook, Hong Kong,
available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/hk.html (last updated Nov. 1, 2005).
102
Sapsin et al., supra note 28, at 160.
98

6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 41 (2006).

population density of 6,300 persons per square kilometer, but reported 1,755 cases in total.103
This data says nothing about how many people must be quarantined or how quickly a state must
quarantine them to control the spread of infectious disease, but it does indicate that WHO is not
is a position to uniformly constrain quarantine policy. Ultimately, by affirming national control
of quarantine, the IHR avoids emersion in a politically controversial subject and promotes
responses that are more adaptable to circumstances in individual states.
II.

THE AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY
MEASURES AND JUSTIFIED TRADE RESTRICTION

The IHR is not the only system of international regulations that functions to protect
against infectious disease. In 1998, the WHO presented information to the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) on the IHR.104 The goal of this meeting was to coordinate the new public
health measures of the IHR with the existing and binding public health framework of the
WTO.105 One of the founding pillars of the WTO is the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.106 This agreement seeks to reduce international trade
barriers by ensuring that “countries apply measures to protect human, animal and plant health
based on assessment of risk.”107 Given that practically all members of the WHO also are
members of the WTO and that the WTO has binding enforcement mechanisms, those in the
WHO charged with revising the IHR understood that “harmonizing the IHR and SPS Agreement
would reflect [a] common purpose and avoid any potential conflict in the obligations of Member
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States.”108 Consequently, the revised IHR was tailored to comport with the SPS Agreement. As
such, an understanding of the IHR and the complete infectious disease international law régime
requires careful examination of the WTO’s role in protecting public health.
A.

The History and Scope of the SPS Agreement

The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) became “the first
multilateral trade agreement that attempted to provide rules for global trade.”109 The
infrastructure of this agreement addressed state behaviors that could affect public health.110 The
framers of GATT attempted to “balance the sovereign right to keep out products that may
threaten a nation’s health with disciplines to prevent this right from being misused for
discriminatory or protectionist purposes.”111
The treatment of British exports following the discovery of mad cow disease serves as an
example of a public health emergency under GATT. In 1996, Britain reported several cases of
mad cow disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (“BSE”)), which scientists linked to a
fatal human brain disease called Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.112 In reaction, the European Union
(“EU”) banned all exports of British beef.113 The disease claimed ten human lives by 1997, and
the British beef industry had lost over $2.37 billion dollars by 1999.114 Though not in force at
the time, this incident illustrates a clear public health emergency under Article XX(b) of GATT:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevails, or a distinguished restriction on
108
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international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . . necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health.115
In the case of BSE, the disease posed a significant threat of spreading to domestic cattle and
infecting humans. Despite huge financial losses that resulted from the ban, Britain would have
had no recourse under GATT because the ban (1) was not arbitrary, (2) was not disguised or
unjustifiably discriminatory, and (3) was meant to protect life and health.116
However, Article XX(b)’s coverage was not always clear. Parties made radical changes
to GATT in the Uruguay Round.117 In 1993, the WTO substantially revised the goals and
principles of GATT and adopted the SPS Agreement.118 The SPS Agreement moves beyond
Article XX(b) in two substantial ways. First, a protective sanitary trade measure meets the SPS
Agreement if and only if it “is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence.”119 For example, in 1991, Peru reported a cholera outbreak with
more than 300,000 infected persons.120 Peru lost over $12.9 billion in trade because of
worldwide bans of Peruvian imports that nations imposed at the time of the cholera outbreak.121
Peru complained “that the GATT rules were being ignored and other states were imposing tradedamaging health protection measures against Peru that lacked scientific support or clear public
health rationales.”122 The SPS Agreement’s scientific justification clause solves this problem
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because “[n]o longer can health policy that affects trade be created out of fear, superstition, or
any other illegitimate basis.” 123 Instead, trade restrictions imposed in response to infectious
disease outbreaks must be “made fairly and for legitimate reasons.”124
The SPS Agreement also moves beyond GATT’s initial scope because all WTO Member
States must adopt its terms.125 As one of the founding WTO multilateral agreements, “any State
wanting to become a Member State of WTO has to accept the SPS Agreement.”126 Therefore the
WTO has the authority to settle any dispute between Member States over whether trade bans
“involving scientific or technical issues” actually are protectionist measures designed to keep
foreign products out of a state’s economy.127 Unlike the prior GATT procedure, where little
recourse could be taken against a party that disagreed with the decision of a dispute settlement
panel, the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure allows states to impose trade sanctions for
violations.128 Whereas prior to the SPS Agreement Peru had no practical means to attack “tradedamaging health measures that lack[ed] scientific rationale,”129 the binding dispute settlement
provisions attached to the SPS Agreement would assure Peru a chance to argue its position to the
WTO. Thus, the SPS Agreement is “the first international agreement attempting to balance trade
and public health that contains a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.”130
B.

The SPS Agreement, the Precautionary Principle, and Scientific Justification

Scientific justification under the SPS Agreement is a highly contentious issue when
applied to the spread of infectious disease. Not surprisingly, when an infectious disease
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threatens to disrupt highly profitable trade, the strength and scope of the SPS Agreement come
under fire.
The interplay between the scientific justification requirement and the Precautionary
Principle was at issue as nations struggled with the threat of made cow disease (BSE). The
Precautionary Principle embodies the rule that “countries may take precautionary measures to
protect their populace from disease.”131 In 1999, the EU responded to the BSE scare by
uniformly banning the use of animal remains with a high risk of containing BSE.132 The EU ban
included a prohibition on imports of animal feed and secondary products containing animal parts,
including pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and lubricants that contain tallow (boiled animal fat).133
Tallow derivatives are the key ingredients in more than $4.5 billion of U.S. pharmaceutical
exports.134 After negotiations with the United States, the EU dropped its ban on products
containing tallow while still maintaining that soaps and cosmetics containing beef products could
transmit BSE.135 In 2001, the WTO’s SPS Committee met to discuss the application of the SPS
Agreement to the BSE epidemic.136 Peru, Chile, and the United States complained that the EU’s
restrictions on certain type of feed for cattle were not scientifically justified.137
One major point of contention was whether the EU’s trade barriers and risk classification
system were “a legitimate exercise of the Precautionary Principle.”138 The EU took the position
that the SPS Agreement allowed it “to ban a product as long as there is a legitimate belief that
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the product poses a threat to health and the environment even if no concrete scientific evidence
supports such a belief.”139 However, the European Commission’s (“EC”) own communication
states that the Precautionary Principle applies “where preliminary objective scientific evaluation
indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that [there are] potentially dangerous
effects.”140 The implication of the EU’s position was that under the Precautionary Principle “a
state could prevent an import indefinitely until evidence convinces it otherwise.”141 Article 5.7
of the SPS Agreement clearly limits such an argument, 142 stating that:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available
pertinent information . . . . In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain
the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and
review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable
period of time.143
A ban on products that actually had been shown to transmit BSE to humans or a ban on feeding
practices shown to transmit BSE between cattle would satisfy SPS requirements, even if the risk
of transmission is low. However, no objective evidence demonstrating a risk of disease
transmission existed in this case.
The WTO rejected the EU’s invocation of the Precautionary Principle and required
removal of the EU’s ban.144 The WTO also rejected similar arguments by the EC with respect to
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its ban on beef containing certain hormones in the late 1990s.145 In that case, the WTO
Appellate Panel noted that “the Precautionary Principle has been incorporated and given a
specific meaning in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.”146 The Panel acknowledged its
responsibility to determine “whether ‘sufficient scientific evidence’ exists to warrant the
maintenance . . . of a particular SPS measure” and held that “the Precautionary Principle does not
. . . relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal (i.e. customary international law)
principles of treaty interpretation in reading the provisions of the SPS Agreement.”147 Although
the panel indicated that Member States deserve some deference when acting to protect against
“irreversible . . . damage to human health[,]” it affirmatively stopped short of creating an SPS
loophole that would allow a state to enact such a protectionist measure without scientific
evidence.148
Through the SPS participation requirement and the WTO’s enforcement mechanisms,
nations may demand objective and verifiable evidence to support trade barriers. This structure
cleverly encourages nations to take a proactive role in preventing infectious disease. Where
under GATT a state could use the unverifiable prospective threat of disease to impose import
bans, the SPS Agreement compels preventive and reactive research both to protect domestic
populations from harm and to protect exports from deceptive trade practices.
III.

THE ROLE OF THE IHR AND THE SPS AGREEMENT IN A H5N1 AVIAN FLU PANDEMIC
One law and economics commentator noted that “even a ‘medium-level’ flu pandemic

could cause up to 200,000 U.S. deaths and a purely economic impact (that is, ignoring the non-
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pecuniary cost of death and illness) of more than $150 billion.”149 According to other accounts,
a “relatively minor” H5N1 pandemic in Asia would likely cause a “loss of 6.5 per cent of Asian
GDP, probably contributing to a global recession and reducing global trade of goods and services
by 14 per cent, or [$2,500 billion dollars].”150 The magnitude of this threat begs the question:
What role would the IHR and the SPS Agreement play in the event of an avian flu outbreak?
A.

Hypothetical H5N1 Outbreak and the Application of International
Regulations

An outbreak of avian flu could follow a pattern similar to that of the SARS outbreak,
except on a larger scale. Suppose that in November 2008, an NGO in China reports that during
the past week 1% of the population of Hong Kong (130,000 people) have begun showing flu-like
symptoms. The Chinese government denies these reports, but begins substantially limiting travel
into and out of the country and simultaneously freezes out the foreign media. Suppose further
that Singapore reports outbreaks of a mutated form of the H5N1 flu to the WHO, including over
8,000 confirmed H5N1 cases with 1,050 deaths. In response, Singapore has ordered the in-home
quarantine of over 20,000 citizens and has halted all egress travel. The Netherlands reports to
the WHO the localized transmission of an unknown pathogen to several Rotterdam dockworkers,
their families, and the staff at a local hospital (twenty people, including four Belgium nationals,
and two deaths). In response to these reports, Canada bans all imports from China, Singapore,
and the Netherlands and places a trade ban on all Belgian chocolate.
Under the revised IHR, the situations in Singapore and in China constitute international
public health emergencies. Both situations indicate a public health threat of spreading a serious
disease that requires a coordinated international response. In October 2005, both Romania and
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Turkey reported the first cases of the H5N1 avian influenza in Europe.151 With only 117 cases of
human transmission worldwide, H5N1 was not yet a medical condition harming a large human
population.152 However, the 1918 Spanish-flu epidemic claimed more than fifty million lives,
and just like H5N1 avian influenza, it “originated in birds before mutating and spreading to
humans.”153 Given the mobility of this disease, evidence of cross-border transmission, and the
historical significance of previous incarnations of similar diseases, the current virus “could
present significant harm to humans.”154 The situations in Singapore and in China also would fall
under the new IHR.
The IHR decision instrument compels Singapore to report the H5N1 human infection and
unexpected outbreak of this new form influenza.155 The Siracusa Principles support Singapore’s
containment policy so long as it does not violate minimum human rights norms – such as by
declining to provide access to food and water for those quarantined.156 Because China refuses to
provide information about a possible outbreak, the WHO may rely on reports from the NGO.157
If verified, the magnitude and the expectation of the spread of the disease would compel the
WHO to declare the Chinese outbreak a health emergency of international concern.158
The situation in the Netherlands is less clear. It may be proper for the Netherlands to
report the outbreak because the outbreak is unexpected, carries a high potential for serious
impact, and may affect international trade. However, given the small number of reported
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infections and the unknown nature of the pathogen, there remains a subjective determination to
be made by the Dutch as to whether a report to the WHO is obligatory.159
Under the SPS Agreement, Canada’s ban on all goods from China, Singapore, and the
Netherlands is defensible.160 A sovereign nation may limit traffic and goods from Singapore,
who openly reported contamination. Similarly, the reported magnitude of the outbreak in China
and the Chinese government’s refusal to cooperate with world health officials gives Canada just
cause to close its borders to Chinese imports.161 Likewise, Canada’s reaction to the Dutch is
defensible because there is an arguable link between Dutch dockworkers coming into contact
with people or goods from Asia.162
However, the SPS Agreement would only allow this application of the Precautionary
Principle to run so long as the data supported Canada’s position.163 If the Netherlands reports
that the disease outbreak is contained or is unrelated to the H5N1 outbreak in Asia, Canada either
would need to submit scientific evidence to the contrary or would need to drop its ban.
Similarly, if several weeks go by with no new cases in Holland, or if health workers offered
medically sound treatment and containment, Canada could not justify its position.164 Finally,
Canada’s ban on Belgian chocolate would violate the SPS Agreement.165 The ban is
discriminatory in that it impacts only one particular item of trade goods and is scientifically
unjustified because no cases of H5N1 have been reported in Belgium.
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B.

Strengths and Weakness of International Regulations in an H5N1 Outbreak

As opposed to the original IHR, the revised IHR is responsive and productive during this
potential H5N1 pandemic. Influenza was not a listed disease under the old IHR, and there was
no official influenza vaccination certification requirement. Despite the widespread outbreak of
an identified infectious disease, under the original IHR Singapore would have had no obligation
to report to the WHO or any other county the potential danger of a spreading pandemic. Though
the flu-like symptoms in China raise the specter of a cholera outbreak, China too would have had
no duty to report an unidentified widespread illness. Furthermore, with greater than $583 billion
in exports in 2004, 166 China would have had a great deal of incentive to keep its export market
secure by not reporting a domestic epidemic.
Similarly, the Netherlands would have had no reason to report any health concerns under
the original IHR. The illness may have spread through unsatisfactory sanitary conditions in the
Rotterdam seaport, but it is unlikely that a cost-benefit analysis would have compelled the
Netherlands to take reactive reporting and sanitary measures in light of the limited disease
transmission. Lastly, the old IHR would not have sustained Canada’s imposition of health
measures on incoming vessels because the old regulations did not permit nations to take any
measures to protect public health that were more restrictive than the IHR itself proscribed.
The new regulations eliminate many of these problems and allow the WHO to play a
larger role in the public health emergencies of all three countries. First, the revised IHR creates a
system where the WHO can collect data and coordinate a response to the emergencies. By using
NGO public health data, the IHR compels China to adjust its policies in response to the WHO’s
unsanctioned infectious disease report. Resolving public health emergencies and suppressing
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cross border disease transmission is a positive sum effort, but issues of sovereignty, lack of
resources, and lack of motivation normally would limit the international response of individual
nations. Through the revised IHR, the WHO also can use NGO and national health data to
identify the similarities between the China, Singapore, and Netherlands H5N1 outbreaks as well
as to track the geographic transmission pathways, to analyze the H5N1 threat to other nations,
and to coordinate an international response to mitigate the harm and prevent further spreading.
These containment measures, which extend beyond the borders of any particular nation, would
be essential to minimizing the scope and effect of an international H5N1 epidemic.
Second, although the IHR affirms the sovereign right of Singapore to determine its own
internal quarantine policy, international involvement promotes scrutiny of human rights. Though
merely an international peer pressure system of human rights, the IHR’s approach is
comparatively progressive to the old regulations and creates a framework upon which individual
states can build. Moreover, combined with the WHO’s response coordination, the IHR raises the
likelihood of international participation in funding and maintaining humane quarantine
conditions.
The weaknesses of the IHR in an H5N1 outbreak are similar to the limitations present in
other types of international regulation. First, enforcement is highly problematic in best-case
scenarios and impossible under less favorable circumstances. The WHO has no recourse against
China for China’s refusal to cooperate with health officials. Moreover, in some cases, the
WHO’s use of NGO data concerning H5N1 outbreaks could backfire. In the face of such a
severe health threat, nations such as China or Russia might further restrain the freedom of NGOs
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and lessen transparency when disclosure of NGO information threatens national exports and
profits.167
Second, developing nations with limited public health resources face the same problems
under the new IHR as they faced under the old regulations. Although the revised IHR may be
more effective in the face of an H5N1 epidemic, the IHR does not, of course, provide nations
with the funding to implement the proscribed regulations or even to create the infrastructure
necessary for implementation. Given that political interest in countries with limited trade value
may be limited, poorer countries are unlikely to have the resources to implement many of the
IHR’s new requirements. As such, the new IHR could devolve into a de facto reactive system
for some countries.
The positive and negative value of the SPS Agreement in an H5N1 outbreak is much less
clear. As a preventative measure, however, the SPS Agreement’s benefit is substantial. The
scientific justification requirement functions as both a sword and a shield for nations whose
economies depend largely upon international trade. China – along with the rest of Asia – has a
strong motivation to conduct scientific research on the H5N1 avian flu. Nations that understand
the nature of the disease and the mechanics of its transmission can use that information to argue
against unjustifiable trade bans. Thus the SPS Agreement provides nations with a weapon to
combat restrictions on that nation’s exports. This same research works as a shield to justify and
protect the researching nation’s legitimate trade restrictions, providing support for that nation’s
import bans. Of course, the same H5N1 research inspired for the protection of trade also would
be critical to the development of both preventive and reactive scientific solutions to the bird flu
epidemic.
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With the knowledge that Canada could uniformly ban all Chinese exports based on a
legitimate fear of the H5N1 virus, China would be strongly motivated to implement prophylactic
measures in protection of both its bird and its human populations. By implementing an effective
domestic response mechanism and by providing scientific evidence of a working inoculation,
China would have the tools to combat what could become an unreasonable and harmful
Canadian trade barrier. Thus the SPS Agreement encourages both proactive and reactive
infectious disease response and it creates a system of scientific information leverage in trade
disputes.
The SPS Agreement’s weaknesses during an H5N1 outbreak also are significant. First,
the scientific leverage may be largely symbolic. As with concerns about genetically-modified
foods in Europe or fear of mad cow disease in Japan, if the internal political and social pressure
is sufficient then Canada will ban all Chinese goods despite credible evidence that such a
reaction would be scientifically unjustifiable. Conversely, as import markets grow dependent on
Chinese goods, domestic forces within Canada could prevent a uniform trade ban despite
compelling scientific evidence that indicated greater restrictions are warranted. As a reactionary
tool to prevent the spread of the H5N1 flu, the SPS Agreement therefore may have limited
influence.
The second weakness of the SPS Agreement is the long-term nature of dispute resolution
and enforcement though the WTO. In the hypothetical, Singapore has 1,050 H5N1 deaths in one
week. The threat of a binding dispute resolution one to two years after the first resulting trade
barriers would have no impact on the actual reactions of other nations to the quickly-spreading
and relatively short-term threat of H5N1 avian flu. Rather, countries would ban imports from
Singapore immediately and worry about international law repercussions later.
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Such a dispute resolution process could provide retroactive relief for wrongly-affected
nations once the pandemic is over. However, like all permissive WTO trade sanctions, a positive
resolution would largely be constrained by the practicalities of any changing prices in the
domestic market. That is, the seemingly victorious nation would be forced to balance the value
accrued through permissive tariffs that diminish the demand for a particular import against the
benefits harvested by the domestic population who are able to buy at a higher price and the loss
felt by the domestic population shutout of the new market.
Finally, as with other aspects of the WTO, some might claim that the SPS Agreement
disregards the needs of developing nations. With limited or nonexistent research capabilities,
developing nations would have difficulty advancing any scientifically-supported arguments
against trade or travel bans once an industrialized nation claims that a ban is scientifically
reasonable. Furthermore, industrialized nations might invoke the Precautionary Principle to
justify a trade ban. Developing nations without research capabilities would be unable to provide
any scientific evidence to the contrary. Thus, the SPS Agreement leaves developing nations in a
position of weakness similar to that experienced under the old GATT.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, both the IHR and SPS Agreement reflect a maturing understanding of the
needs of the international community in combating the spread of disease and both agreements
would function more effectively than their respective predecessors in the context of a H5N1 bird
flu pandemic. The revised IHR is a foundational agreement allowing the international
community to designate the WHO as the central data collection body to help prevent outbreak
and to coordinate a response that mitigates the impact on infected populations and international
neighbors. Unlike the previous international health regulations, the revised IHR would classify
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the H5N1 flu as a public health emergency and would dictate the rights and duties of countries
facing the emergency within their borders. The SPS Agreement cultivates a scientific
justification standard for health-based trade barriers and provides a neutral forum for disputes
and, in the face of a developing H5N1 threat, these features of the Agreement should inspire
government funding of research to understand, prevent, and combat the disease. Much like
environmental international law, these regulations suffer from weaknesses in enforcement
mechanisms that could limit their effectiveness, but from a broad perceptive they clearly are
progressive. The two sets of regulations acknowledge and promote flexible responses by
sovereign nations without overreaching. They create incentive for information sharing and
facilitate the role of an international body in leading the positive sum effort to prevent and
control public health emergencies. Taken together, the IHR and the SPS Agreement create a
more coherent and useful framework for coordinated international response to the serious and
contemporary threat of an H5N1 epidemic.
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